Increased DLPFC activity during moral decisionmaking in psychopathy Tassy et al. 1 inquire as to whether psychopathy was associated with differential activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in our study of moral decision-making in psychopathy. 2 This is an important question that we had not considered previously. Tassy et al.
1 also ask about behavioral responding and activity in another relevant brain region, the insula. Here we provide additional analyses of our data. We find that psychopathy is associated with increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during emotional moral decision-making. No significant relationship was observed between psychopathy and behavioral responses to the dilemmas. These findings, in conjunction with the reduced activity in emotion-related regions reported previously, 2 suggest that psychopathic individuals may use alternative strategies to make moral judgments; alternative interpretations are also discussed.
Tassy et al. 1 highlight the important role of the DLPFC in recent theories regarding brain functioning in moral judgment. In particular, the DLPFC has been hypothesized to have at least three distinctive roles: (1) to provide cognitive control to override prepotent social-emotional responses elicited by the dilemmas, 3 (2) to facilitate abstract reasoning (e.g., cost-benefit analyses), 3, 4 and (3) to generate self-centered and other-aversive emotions (e.g., anger, frustration or moral disgust). 5 Tassy et al. 1 suggest that the examination of this region in our sample of individuals with varying degrees of psychopathic traits may help to clarify the role of DLPFC in moral judgment.
We defined a new region of interest in the DLPFC (see Supplementary Methods) and carried out the same correlational analysis as previously reported. 2 Participants with higher psychopathy scores showed increased activity in the right DLPFC ( Figure 1 ). Analyses of the four factors of psychopathy showed that DLPFC activity was positively associated with Factor 3 (Impulsive lifestyle) and Factor 4 (Antisocial) of psychopathy (F3: 21, 60, 18; 46 voxels, T = 2.59, P = 0.048, corrected; F4: 21, 60, 21; 117 voxels, T = 3.03, P = 0.024, corrected); a trend-level relationship was observed for Factor 2 (Affective) (21, 60, 21; 26 voxels, T = 1.98, P = 0.114, corrected). No relationship was observed with Factor 1 (Interpersonal).
Tassy et al.
1 also inquired about activity in the insula, given its role in encoding disgust. No significant relationship was found between total or factor psychopathy scores and activity in the insula. Associations between insula activity and Factors 1 and 2 were in the negative direction, but did not survive correction for multiple comparisons (P > 0.251).
Finally, Tassy et al. 1 asked whether psychopathic individuals give more utilitarian responses, as might be predicted based on the findings reported for patients with bilateral, adult onset damage to the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPC). 6 Results from our sample, as well as from additional subjects from the same population, indicated that there was not a significant relationship between psychopathy scores and the proportion of 'yes' (e.g., utilitarian) responses to the personal moral dilemmas. 7 This lack of behavioral differences in moral judgment appears to be consistent with forthcoming data from other groups (e.g., M Hauser, personal communication). Taken together, these findings suggest that more psychopathic individuals are able to provide relatively similar moral judgments to less psychopathic individuals, despite differences in activation in the amygdala and the DLPFC. Such findings may lend support for a hypothesis that has been previously set forth-that in the absence of appropriate input from emotion-related regions, psychopathic individuals may make use of alternative cognitive strategies to process emotional information. 8 More psychopathic individuals, who show reduced amygdala activity when processing the emotionally salient moral dilemmas, 2 may use abstract reasoning processes to a greater extent than less psychopathic individuals. Thus, these findings may provide support for the role of the DLPFC in abstract reasoning processes (hypothesis 2 mentioned above), though not to the exclusion of the other two hypotheses.
This finding of increased DLPFC activity in psychopathy is consistent with previous studies. Rilling et al. 9 found increased activity in the DLPFC in more psychopathic individuals when choosing to cooperate with another individual, suggesting that psychopathic individuals may require more DLPFC activation to choose a morally appropriate option (see Supplementary Discussion) . Similarly, increased activity in the DLPFC has been observed during emotional processing in both criminal psychopaths 8 and undergraduates scoring higher in psychopathy. 10 In the moral dilemmas used in the present study, participants were asked whether a particular action was appropriate or not; 4 with less input from emotion-related regions, it is possible that psychopathic individuals rely more on abstract reasoning processes to determine whether specific actions are appropriate according to societal standards. Thus, although they may cognitively know the difference between right and wrong (i.e., the moral judgment), they may not have the feeling of what is right and wrong, 11 and thus may lack the motivation to translate their moral judgments into appropriate moral behavior. Alternatively, our findings of no differences in moral judgments of the more psychopathic individuals despite reduced activity in the amygdala may suggest that the emotional processes impaired in psychopathy may not be necessary for moral judgment, or more specifically, that the amygdala may not have a significant role in moral judgment despite its importance for emotional processing in other domains. Emotional processes that are impaired in psychopathy may have their most critical role in motivating morally relevant behavior once a judgment has been made. 12 On this view, the deficit observed among psychopaths results from a failure to link moral judgment to behavior with appropriately motivating emotions.
We thank Tassy et al. 1 for their inquiry and hope to have answered some of the questions posed; however, many questions still remain. Our study is limited by a small sample size, so findings should be considered preliminary. Future studies will be necessary to further elucidate the role of the DLPFC and other regions both in moral decision-making and psychopathy.
